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I. INTRODUCTION
As most legal readers know, members of the Critical Race Studies
(CRS) school" and mainstream civil rights scholars have been carrying
on a rather spectacular and highly public debate. First, Randall Ken-
nedy, a mainstream scholar, took the newcomers to task in his Racial
Critiques article,2 charging us with making unfounded accusations and
grandiose claims,' with finding racial exclusion where none exists,4 and
with various other sins of omission and commission. The controversy
moved next to the pages of the popular press.6 Then, in the June 1990
issue of Harvard Law Review, three members of CRS and a white sym-
pathizer were given an opportunity to respond.1
In his Introduction to that group of responses, Scott Brewer, a
young, as-yet unaligned scholar, issued a call for peace.8 Both sides
share a common goal, Brewer wrote; why can they not set aside their
differences and work together to realize it?9 This Essay addresses ap-
1. The loos coalition's program and methods are described at subpart I1(A) infra. See also
Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95, 95 n.1
(1990) (outlining elements of CRS program); Wiener, Law Profs Fight the Power, The Nation,
Sept. 4/11, 1989, at 246 (describing controversy over CRS and Kennedy's article, infra note 2).
Other terms applied to the movement are Critical Race Theory, New Race Theory, and sometimes,
colloquially, "Race Crits."
2. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989). The initial
response of mainstream civil rights scholars to early CRS scholarship was fairly mild. See O'Neil,
A Reaction to The Imperial Scholar and Professor Delgado's Proposed Solution, 3 LAw & INE-
QUALrrY 255 (1985). By the time Kennedy wrote his article, however, concern over the new move-
ment was running high. See, e.g., Rothfeld, Minority Critic Stirs Debate on Minority Writing,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at B6, col. 3 (anonymous law professor says dissatisfaction with the new
movement is broadly shared).
3. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1746, 1760-78 (unfounded accusations of racial exclusion); id. at
1746, 1778-87 (unfounded claims of racial distinctiveness in CRS writing).
4. Id. at 1760-78.
5. Id. at 1787-1801 (misguided efforts at claiming or denying "standing"); id. at 1801-07 (self-
seeking promotion of race as a scholarly credential); id. at 1807-17 (unwarranted militarization of
discourse and calculated or cynical playing of the "race game").
6. E.g., Wiener, supra note 1; Racism in Legal Academe, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 27, 1990, at 6,
col. 1; Rothfeld, supra note 2.
7. Colloquy: Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 HARv.
L. REv. 1844 (1990). The colloquy contains articles by Robin Barnes, Leslie Espinoza, and Richard
Delgado, all associated with the Critical Race Studies movement, and Milner Ball, a white male
sympathizer.
8. Brewer, Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial Critiques Debate, id. at 1844-54.
9. Id. at 1847 (stating that it "seems plausible to assume ... that Kennedy and his critics
had a 'common goal' whose acknowledgment, although allowing for 'respectful disagreement,'
might prevent the debate from collapsing into a 'ferocious ideological struggle' . . . [and] 'bitter
personal enmity' "); id. at 1851 (noting that it is "possible for Kennedy and his critics to share that
broad goal"); id. at 1854 (stating that "Kennedy and his critics do share a goal whose importance is
so overwhelming as to dwarf instrumental disagreement about the best ways to achieve it").
Is Brewer guilty of essentialism-of imposing sameness on adversaries who see themselves as
quite different-or of denying scholars of color the "right to squabble"? See infra note 13 and
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peals, like Brewer's, to common cause. I first explore the inner logic of
these appeals to see what functions they may serve. I then apply this
analysis to the dispute between CRS and the mainstream figures. Al-
though scholars have investigated the conditions of cooperation in other
areas, 0 little has been written on appeals to common cause in connec-
tion with radical legal movements like CRS. I focus attention on the
form and politics of such appeals, as well as on their merits and chance
of success. When are appeals to common cause helpful, and when are
they naive, incoherent, or even disingenuous?1"
II. APPEALS TO COMMON CAUSE
Common-cause appeals conceivably could be made to any two dis-
puting factions, but not with equal cogency or probability of success.
For example, suppose a visitor from another planet approaches both
sides of the abortion controversy and urges them to end their quarrel
and work together. Both are concerned, the visitor points out, with the
same things-women's welfare, human dignity, and respect for life.
Given these common goals, the two groups should stop working at cross
accompanying text (essentialism sometimes warranted). This is a subtle and sensitive point within
the community of minority scholars.
Earlier, Derrick Bell, a leading CRS figure, urged Kennedy not to publish his article, arguing
that it could harm the cause of civil rights and chill the development of alternative legal scholar-
ship. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 96 n.8. Although some first amendment absolutists criticized
Bell's letter as a form of censorship, to my way of thinking, Brewer's appeal represents a more
troubling threat to diversity in scholarship than does Bell's. Bell merely called for Kennedy to
conduct his critique in private, not public forums, to keep the dispute "within the family"--a
position with which I disagree. Nevertheless, Bell arguably was calling only for a time-place-man-
ner restriction. Brewer, on the other hand, urges the two groups to take the sharp edges off their
respective positions in order to better blend and work together. This would entail qualitative com-
promises in content, particularly for CRS. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
10. The principal areas that have been investigated are negotiation and alternative dispute
resolution, e.g., R FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981) (negotiation between individuals or
small groups); L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATONS LAW (2d ed. 1967) (negotiation among nations);
and game theory and the politics of interest groups, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DE-
MOCRACY (1965).
11. Although peacemaking has a long and honorable history, and Brewer should be com-
mended for urging the two groups of civil rights scholars to focus on what unites rather than what
divides them, history and literature are full of appeals for peace that have failed. These appeals
have failed because the peacemaker has not dealt with the underlying source of conflict, because
one or more parties is unwilling to compromise, because conflict has become habitual, or for a
myriad of other reasons, some of which I explore immediately infra.
For literary examples of long-running feuds that withstood appeals to peace and self-interest,
see W. FAULKNER, SARToRiS (1929) (continuing antagonisms between North and South a half cen-
tury after the end of the Civil War) and W. SHAKESPEARE, RoMEo AND JULIET (1600) (vendetta
between houses of Capulet and Montague ended only by two lovers' deaths). "Real world" exam-
ples of unending feuds are, unfortunately, legion: labor and capital; East and West; Arabs and
Jews; strict and broad constructionists.
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purposes, demilitarize their discourse toward each other,12 and unite in
a common cause. Both parties would reject such an appeal as ludicrous,
but why? It is not because the factions reject the goals the visitor re-
minds them of; actually, they embrace them wholeheartedly. Rather,
the issue that divides them is, in their minds, both more subtle and
more urgent. That the groups could agree on more concretely or ab-
stractly stated goals, such as women's need for food, shelter, and equal
respect, is almost beside the point.
Other situations will call more clearly for cooperation. Imagine two
mountaineers who have suffered an accident on a dangerous slope. Most
of their equipment has been swept away. They must reach the bottom
of the mountain by nightfall. One of the climbers has a rope, the other
water. Plainly, the two should cooperate; their common danger over-
whelms any differences between them.1"
Other cases will fall between these extremes, for example, when
both sides have a common goal but working together will bring
subordinate goals into conflict. Imagine two sled teams trying to reach
the North Pole. A prize awaits each to arrive, but being first brings no
advantage. The teams obviously should cooperate. Now imagine, how-
ever, that commercial sponsorships of future expeditions await the team
that arrives first, or that one team wants to perform scientific experi-
ments along the way, while the other team has little interest in science.
Even though the teams have a common goal, division over these second-
ary goals may cause them to pursue separate courses. Finally, the com-
mon goal may prove Musory-both teams want to go to the North Pole,
but one team means the magnetic pole, the other, the geographic one.
Joining forces ensures that one or both teams will end up at the wrong
destination.
III. BREWER'S PLEA
As the above examples suggest, appeals to common cause are most
likely to prove effective if the parties actually have a pressing common
goal, if they see that cooperation will help more than hinder achieving
it, and if working toward that goal does not require sacrificing impor-
tant subordinate ones. It also will help if the parties speak a common
12. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1815 (charging CRS writers with unwarranted militarizing
of discourse).
13. For example, imagine that one of the climbers (up to this point the two have been climb-
ing separately) uses mechanical aids, such as pitons hammered into the rock face, but the other is
a purist who finds those practices a defilement of nature. Despite these differences, the climbers
probably will cooperate, at least until they reach the bottom. Brewer may have been seeing the
civil rights predicament, at least in some of its aspects, in this way. If so, no one could quarrel with
him--death is the most essentializing, totalizing event of all.
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language in which they can discuss these matters.14 Applying these cri-
teria to the CRS-versus-Kennedy dispute requires a brief overview of
CRS's program and methodology and the respects in which these differ
from those of the mainstream scholars.
The two camps do agree on certain things, in particular (1) every-
thing Kennedy prefixes with the words "of course" in his Racial Criti-
ques article,1 5 and (2) everything he wrote before writing Racial
Critiques."6 Violence and insults against people of color are bad.'7 Ra-
cist jurors who prejudge black defendants are bad.' Stereotyping
blacks as lazy or intellectually inferior is bad. 19 Executing blacks more
frequently than whites for the same crimes is bad.20 Increasing the
14. The importance of each of these criteria varies depending on the type of common-cause
appeal being made. Brewer might have been urging that CRS and mainstream scholars:
(1) unite behind concrete reform proposals, e.g., federal legislation;
(2) aim for mutual comprehension (i.e., try to better "understand each other");
(3) aim for willingness to compromise and be persuaded by each other; or
(4) some combination or order of the above (or, indeed, some other version of common cause).
Because Brewer does not clarify which form of appeal he is making, see Brewer, supra note 8, at
1847, 1851, 1854 (meaning, respectively, (1) work to be done, (2) parties should work to eliminate
blocks to comprehension, and (3) willingness to compromise or accept differences), I address all
three. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text (possibility of productive discussion); infra
note 58 and accompanying text (disagreements over goals); infra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text (possibility for compromise).
15. Dismissive or grudging concessions of existing racism and the need to work to confront it
appear throughout Kennedy's article. See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1748 (stating that we need
"to transform society, including of course, the law schools"); id. at 1752 (emphasis added) (noting
that covert color bars which stereotyped blacks as intellectually inferior are "of particular rele-
vance" in understanding the appearance of critical movements of scholars of color); id. at 1760
(emphasis added) (stating that given "the pervasiveness and tenacity of racial prejudice in Ameri-
can culture, it is readily imaginable that current practice. . . in legal academia could be tainted
by biases"); id. at 1765 (emphasis added) (stating that this "is not to discourage efforts to unmask
and reform criteria that fail. . . to accomplish . . . the purposes they purportedly serve"); id. at
1767 (emphasis added) (noting that his "comments should not be read to suggest that legal
academia is free of racial prejudice"); id. at 1780 (emphasis added) (stating that this "is not to say
that Matsuda's assertions are wholly incorrect"); id. at 1807 (emphasis added) (stating that there
is "nothing necessarily wrong with race-conscious affirmative action"); id. at 1816 (observing that
racial differences may exist in jury behavior).
16. Prior to writing Racial Critiques, Kennedy wrote a number of articles on various aspects
of racial justice. All were solid contributions; none elicited complaints from the left. E.g., Kennedy,
Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE:
L.J. 999 (1989); Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court,
101 HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988) [hereinafter Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp]; Kennedy, Persuasion
and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327 (1986); Ken-
nedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 1622 (1986).
17. Kennedy, suprai note 2, at 1751-53; id. at 1767 (deploring the "Derrick Bell incident," in
which a leading black professor suffered humiliating treatment at Stanford Law School).
18. See id. at 1816 nn.229-301. See generally Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp, supra note 16.
19. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1751, 1753, 1797, 1801-07, 1817.
20. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp, supra note 16, at 1396-1400.
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number of "qualified" law professors of color is good. 1 Despite these
agreements, formidable differences of substance and style remain.
A. Overview of Critical Race Studies
1. Program
Critical race scholarship sprang up in the late 1970s with the reali-
zation that the civil rights movement of the 1960s had stalled, and
many of its gains were being rolled back.22 It was time to stop persever-
ating; we no longer could justify depleting our already frustrated energy
on what we had been doing all along-filing amicus briefs, coining new
litigation strategies, writing another law review article exhorting judges
to exercise moral leadership in the search for racial justice-in hope of
making things better.2" We needed new ideas and theories-sometimes
if you are up a tree and a flood is coming, you have to climb down
before climbing up a taller one.24
Accordingly, we have been borrowing and experimenting with new
approaches, examining, for example, the relationship between naming
and reality.25 We have been looking at the relation between knowledge,
especially legal knowledge, and power,26 and exploring the role of lib-
eral-capitalist ideology in maintaining an unjust racial status quo.27 We
21. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1761 (stating that "Bell rightly insists upon considering
whether ... prejudices play a role" in suppressing the number of black professors); id. at 1762-63,
1765 (noting that Bell ignores the possibility of black candidates lacking the traditional standards);
id. at 1765-68, 1813-14 (calling attention to the "real problem"); see also infra subpart III(B)(1)(a)
(discussing the role of merit).
22. Address by Richard Delgado, New Voices in Legal Scholarship (AALS Workshop), in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 8, 1989) (tape on file with AALS) [hereinafter New Voices]. For a detailed
discussion of the ebb and flow of civil rights doctrine and consciousness, see D. BELL, AND WE ARE
NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
23. New Voices, supra note 22.
24. I owe the metaphor to Alan Freeman, whose work has been an inspiration. On the diffi-
culty of formulating, or even imagining, arguments for radical change, because of constraints im-
posed by legal categories, see Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law
Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (right to "name our reality"); Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989);
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320 (1989); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
26. Delgado, supra note 25; Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Delgado, Imperial Scholar]. Critical
Race Scholars borrowed many of these approaches from other areas of critical scholarship, such as
Critical Legal Studies, but Critical Race Scholars use the tools to further the more focused goal of
racial justice.
27. D. BELL, supra note 22; Delgado, Imperial Scholar, supra note 26; see also Freeman,
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96
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have been examining the role of legalisms, such as merit, fault, and cau-
sation, in advancing or impairing the search for racial justice.28 We have
been identifying majoritarian self-interest in the ebb and flow of civil
rights doctrine.29 We have been showing how areas of law ostensibly
designed for our benefit often benefit whites even more than blacks.30
2. Methods
In addition to exploring new approaches to racial justice, we have
been experimenting with new forms of scholarship. Many CRSers are
modernists who believe that form and substance are closely con-
nected. 1 Accordingly, some of us have been using parables 3 2 chroni-
cles,3 3 stories,3 and counterstoriess5 to show the false necessity and
unintentional irony of much current civil rights doctrine and scholar-
ship. Many of us have been using unconventional texts-poetry, fiction,
revisionist histories-written by authors of color to illustrate our mes-
sage.3 Some of us have been experimenting with humor, satire, and
irony to show the circular, self-serving, or inequitable aspects of civil
rights jurisprudence. 7 Some of us have called for greater attention to
questions of audience-for whom do we write, and why? 8 Although
none of these elements is new, their combined use over the past decade
by a group of thirty to fifty scholars, most of color, warrants the terms
"movement" or "position" that Kennedy and others apply to us.3 9
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581 (1990).
28. D. BELL, supra note 22; Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will
We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988).
29. Derrick Bell has been the prime, and most persuasive, proponent of this "interest conver-
gence" hypothesis. See D. BELL, supra note 22, at 51-75, 140-62.
30. Id.; see also Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HAIv. L. REv. 518 (1980).
31. On modernism generally, see Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1986) and
Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1213 (1989).
32. E.g., Williams, supra note 25.
33. E.g., D. BELL, supra note 22; Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil
Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1985).
34. E.g., Dalton, The 'Clouded Prism, 22 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (1987); Delgado, supra
note 25; West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARv. L. REv. 384 (1985).
35. E.g., Delgado, supra note 25.
36. The main proponent for this view is Mar Matsuda. See Matsuda, Affirmative Action and
Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11 H~Av. WOMEN's L.J. 1 (1988); see also
Williams, supra note 25.
37. E.g., Delgado, supra note 25, at 2413-15; Williams, supra note 25.
38. E.g., Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539, 543-44 (declaring that her article is
aimed at the audience of women of color).
39. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1746, 1747, 1785, 1807 (discussing CRS's "tenets," "tradi-
tions," "paradigms," and "programs").
1991]
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What are the prospects for a linking of arms between modernist
critical race scholars and conventional civil rights scholars, such as Ken-
nedy? Are we like explorers who purportedly have the same destination
but on examination turn out to have quite different ones in mind? I
think the prospects of rapprochement are not great-most CRSers be-
lieve a flood is coming and that we are up a too-short tree. I may be
wrong, however; we may be like mountaineers, stranded in an accident,
who must cooperate to reach safety. To assess the chances for collabo-
ration I offer two imaginary colloquies, one about merit, the other about
context. My objective is not so much to see which of the two sides
would "win," but whether they could talk usefully-whether they oc-
cupy the same world.
B. Possibilities of Reconciliation
1. Nature of the Impasse: Two Colloquies
To evaluate prospects for the reconciliation that Brewer envisions,
imagine two colloquies between the Crits and mainstream civil rights
scholars. One of the dialogues is about merit, a recurring element in
Kennedy's and the moderate left's writing about racial justice, the other
about context, an article of faith for many CRSers, feminists, and other
postmoderns.
a. Merit
In his Racial Critiques article, Randall Kennedy takes CRS writers
to task for making various claims of race-based exclusion." In each
case, the criticism is the same: None of us has shown that the works or
scholars we say are excluded deserve to have been included.4' Without
proof that a work, citation, or teaching candidate meets the relevant
merit-based standards, one can say nothing about whether or not exclu-
sion is warranted.42
How would CRSers respond to this argument? Most, I think, would
begin by questioning the promise, asking why satisfaction of conven-
tional merit standards should be a precondition for making a claim of
exclusion. We would point out the irony of demanding that insurgent
claims satisfy existing standards when those very standards are among
40. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1760-78 (critiquing Delgado, Imperial Scholar, supra note 26
and Bell's CHRONICLE OF THE DEVINE Girr, in D. BELL, supra note 22 ("seventh candidate")); see
also D. BELL, supra note 22, at 140-61.
41. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1760-63, 1765, 1769-78.
42. See id. at 1774 (stating that "Delgado fails to shoulder the essential burden of champion-
ing on substantive grounds specific works that deserve more recognition than they have been
given").
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the things we want to change.13 We would note that merit standards
pose as objective and fixed, but generally turn out to be highly situa-
tional-move the hoop up or down six inches in a basketball game, and
you change markedly the distribution of who has "merit."", Standards
are etymologically related to where one stands," yet recent scholarship
rejects the notion that any one perspective can be shown to be true,
inevitable, or best.4" Thus, merit is that which I, the preexisting and
presituated self, use to judge you, the Other. The criteria I use sound
suspiciously like a description of me and the place where I stand. 7
The mainstream writer may concede all this, but retreat to a com-
monsense conventionalism: Most persons, in our society at least, under-
stand merit in certain agreed-upon ways.48  Moreover, such
understandings are essential to determining when illegitimate exclusion
has occurred. Wrongful exclusion obviously presupposes some notion of
what "wrongful" means in particular settings, and this, in turn, cannot
be divorced from notions of merit and desert. 9 But the modernist re-
torts that the majority is capable of changing its idea of the relevant
standards over time. A few decades ago, law professors adhered to a
model of law as rational, mechanical, and syllogistic. Today this would
43. Why, for example, when evaluating faculty candidates do we not broaden existing criteria
to include perseverance in the face of obstacles, successful operation as a near-solitary token in an
uncomfortable milieu, first-hand acquaintance with the problems of an excluded group, and will-
ingness to grapple with fundamental critiques of the existing system? See Ball, The Legal Acad-
emy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1855, 1857-62 (1990); Delgado, supra note 1, at 100-
03.
44. I am indebted to Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE L.J. - (forthcoming), for this example. For a nonsports illustration,
consider a competition billed as a musical talent show. Among the entrants are an outstanding
opera singer, an equally outstanding rap star, and an accomplished blues musician. Who will win?
The answer obviously depends on the range of skills the judges require the entrants to perform in
displaying their talent, as well as the range of the judges' knowledge about those skills.
45. WESTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 1387 (2d collegiate ed. 1980) (standard: "a place,...
a point... a standing place").
46. E.g., Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpin-
nings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 517 (1986); see also Gordon, Critical Legal Studies, 10 LEGAL STUD.
F. 335, 339 (1986); Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of
the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 429, 430-31 (1987).
47. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 100-01. But cf. Brewer, supra note 8, at 1850 n.20. Brewer
doubts whether mainstream scholarship has absorbed this lesson yet:
Kennedy can safely assume that most of his readers will themselves assume the legitimacy of
the scientific-legal paradigm; after all, for the past several centuries of European cultural he-
gemony, that style has established its predominance as the paradigm whose mastery virtually
determines the distribution of awards in most of the intellectual professions.
Id.
48. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1772 (invoking "widely accepted ideal of scholarly proce-
dure"); id. at 1762, 1801 (referring to conventionally accepted standards of merit).
49. Id. at 1762-63, 1772-74.
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be regarded as laughable.50 The debate thus proceeds in a circle: the
modernist rejecting necessity and singleness of perspective, the tradi-
tionalist asserting that we must start somewhere, the modernist de-
manding to know why just here, and so on.
b. Context
Kennedy, like most mainstream scholars, embraces universalism
over particularity, abstract principles over how-it-is-for-me at this time
and place." Modern movements like feminism and CRS emphasize the
opposite, in a manner recently known as the "call to context. '52 For the
modernist, general laws may be fine in some areas, but political and
moral discourse is not one of them. Normative discourse is highly fact
sensitive-the addition of even one new fact can change moral intuition
drastically. Imagine, for example, a youth convicted of a serious offense.
The issue is the severity of the punishment. The case is unusually close;
you have no clear intuition one way or the other. Now, add one new
fact-the defendant did the same thing several times before, or was
seen walking away from the scene of the crime laughing. One's intuition
moves toward harsh punishment. Add a different fact-the defendant
was abused as a child, or is mentally impaired. Intuition
changes-leniency now seems more fitting.
Most moral and political discourse, the CRSer might emphasize, is
highly fact sensitive in this fashion. Yet, many mainstream scholars,
when asked to analyze a situation like the one above, (1) will declare
only certain features of the problem relevant, and then (2) will decide
the case under some general principle of law or policy.5" Such an ap-
50. On legal formalism-the view that law consists of drawing logical conclusions from prem-
ises taking the form of rules of law-see Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract,
47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938) (legal realist critiques of formalism) and Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, 8 COLU. L. REv. 605 (1908). On formalism-rationalism generally, see Schlag, supra note 31,
at 1209-13.
51. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1773 & n.116, 1802, 1807; see also Brewer, supra note 8,
at 1850 n.20; Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1772-73 (both referring to this position as "scientific
legal" or "universal[ist]"). On the current movement back toward formal neutrality in public law,
see Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context, 1989 SUP. CT.
REv. 1, 24-46.
52. See Delgado, Mindset & Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1872, 1873 (1990). See generally
Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (collection of articles on narrativity
and subjective experience in legal discourse).
53. See, e.g., Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 99; Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959) (both discussing neutrality
and "colorblindness" in the law of race remedies and sentencing). The movement away from par-
ticularized excuses and defenses in criminal law exemplifies the mindset I have in mind. A con-
servative substrate within this general orientation manifests itself in the movement toward strict
construction. See Schlag, supra note 31, at 1209-13 (discussing "rationalist" and "prerationalist"
legal thought).
[Vol. 44:1
CRITICAL THOUGHTS ON COMMON CAUSE
proach, the modernist insists, "throws away facts" and is inferior to one
that considers them all at once.
To which the mainstream scholar might retort that moral reasoning
is not nearly so contextual as the CRSer or feminist thinks. Particular-
ity may be what calls up moral judgment in given cases, yet those cases
ultimately must be addressed under general rules.54 Thus, principled
argument does not "throw away facts," rather it tells us that some are
more pertinent than others. The relevant principle of law or ethics tells
us which facts are to be considered. These principles are necessary be-
cause morality would be undermined if actors came to see obligations as
merely contextual, or if rules had too many exceptions and loopholes.
Our approach to social and ethical problems must be coherent and sub-
ject to duplication by others. Like cases must be decided in like ways."5
To which the CRSer might reply that the appearance of certainty
and objectivity given by general rules comes at too great a cost. Sub-
suming the present case under a broader rule saves time and gives the
impression of consistency. Yet, just as this case is like that other one, it
also will be unlike it in certain respects. The universalist approach will
conceal those respects, rendering the decision worse than one made free
of the encumbering rule. Political and moral analysis is situa-
tional-truths only exist for this person in this predicament at this time
in history.5 " This impasse, like the earlier colloquy on merit, cannot be
resolved-the argument goes in a circle, driven by dissonant modes of
argument, premises, and understandings about self, objectivity, and
even the "genderedness" of discourse.
5 7
54. The principal spokesperson for this view is Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); see also Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1
(1974).
55. See Winston, supra note 54.
56. See sources cited supra note 53.
57. I say "genderedness" because the need to approach social and moral problems by means
of universal rules tends to be associated, in our society at least, with males. See, e.g., L. KOHLBERG,
ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981) (pronouncing the rule-bound approach superior and most
women's ethical reasoning inferior); see also L. KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MoAL DEVELOP-
mENT: THE NATURE AND VALIDITY OF MORAL STAGES (1984); L KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT. MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981). The women in Kohlberg's
sample approached hypothetical ethical problems on a case-by-case basis, seeking imaginative so-
lutions that the examiner's hypothetical had not contemplated. Because their approach was con-
crete, not abstract, particularized, not universal, Kohlberg placed women at a lower ethical stage
than most men he tested, prompting a well-known reply by Carol Gilligan. See C. GILLGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan argued that
women's approach to ethical reasoning was different from, but not qualitatively inferior to, men's,
and that it was based on an ethic of care and connection, not abstract rule following. A feminist or
postmodernist replicating Kohlberg's study today might go further than Gilligan, finding men's
abstract rule-bound approach positively inferior to women's more context-based one, thus, in effect
reversing the hierarchy and placing men (like those in Kohlberg's sample at any rate), at the bot-
tom and women on the top.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1
2. A Way Out of the Impasse? Brewer's Call for Storytelling
As the colloquies and previous discussion show, the two schools of
civil rights scholars are divided sharply over goals, methods, and even
the terms and pictures they would use to discuss these matters.58 Be-
cause of these differences, Brewer's call for cooperation and common
cause might begin to sound coercive. Consensus gives power to mem-
bers of the dominant group-they dictate its terms, and they determine
when (as with CRS) it has been breached and when it has been re-
stored. 9 Consensus threatens to erase our identity, not that of the
mainstream scholars-it is significant that this Essay is written by
someone in CRS rather than in the latter group.
Perhaps to soften these overtones, Brewer concludes his Foreword
with a call for narrative, for "the telling of stories, to the potential im-
portance of which one coursing stream of Critical Race Theory alerts
us.")60 Legal storytelling, Brewer writes, can soothe some of the "bad
feelings among these common aspirants that stand in need of repair for
the still unfinished and still morally and politically critical work
58. See supra Part H, distinguishing various ways in which an appeal to common cause can
fail, including (1) disagreement over the goal to be attained, and (2) conflict among subgoals. Sup-
pose, despite what I have said about the difficulties of conversation between the two sets of schol-
ars, they nevertheless were able to sit down at a table and talk. Could they find agreement on a
program and objective?
(1) The main goal. Brewer writes that the two camps of civil rights scholars could agree at
least on the main goal of equality among the races, or "equal concern and respect, or anti-subjuga-
tion, or anti-oppression." Brewer, supra note 8, at 1851. This deceptively simple statement of
goals, however, conceals sharply different conceptions of equality. Kennedy's vision of racial justice
consists of the present system minus "social bias," by which he means intentional, provable dis-
crimination aimed at a superbly qualified black candidate. CRS scholars envision racial justice
quite differently. In their vision, persons of color would not need to resemble successful whites to
fit in, but would achieve success without sacrificing what is distinctive about themselves. The sys-
tem would change to meet their unique needs and in the process would expand and enrich itself.
See Delgado, supra note 25; Kennedy, supra note 44.
(2) Means and subordinate goals. CRS scholars also differ with Kennedy in their understand-
ing of the tasks necessary to achieve the goal. For both, the problem could be termed "discrimina-
tion" in the system, but that term would have very different meanings for each. For Kennedy,
ending discrimination means (a) eliminating direct, conscious bigotry aimed at blacks and others,
and (b) assuring- access to a good education so that people of color are equipped to compete. For
CRSers the main obstacle to equality is majority mindset-a vast, interlocking set of conscious and
unconscious structures, of thought and practice, that subordinate people of color for the benefit of
whites. What appear to be common goals, then, are only linguistically similar articulations of dif-
ferent visions-one, incrementalist and moderate, the other radical and ambitious. The common
ground on which the two camps stand is only our common dissatisfaction and rage with the status
quo.
59. They also determine, by reference to their own understandings, when a compromise offer
is reasonable, i.e., what constitutes "meeting the other group halfway." For example, imagine: "We
will agree to expand merit criteria to include perseverance in the face of obstacles, if you will agree
to give up this postmodern silliness about point of view and extremely unflattering ideas about
interest convergence."
60. Brewer, supra note 8, at 1854.
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ahead.""1
Is legal storytelling up to this task? Until now, we have considered
stories and counterstories as tools for changing belief among receptive
but uncommitted members of the majority group.2 Thus, there is a de-
gree of irony in Brewer's suggestion that we in effect treat each other as
though the other were white. We should not reject Brewer's suggestion
merely for this reason, however; the truth often may be ironic. Never-
theless, I confess doubt. Storytelling works best with the uncommitted,
and even then, it must work insinuatively, not frontally. " Stories re-
quire suspension of disbelief. If the listener is on guard or firmly com-
mitted to another position, the story will fail. 4
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons I have mentioned, I believe Brewer's common-
cause appeal is likely to go unheeded. CRS and the mainstream liberals
see the race problem in different terms. They disagree on its shape and
dimensions and, unsurprisingly, offer different prescriptions on how to
61. Id.
62. Indeed, the story Brewer recounts to illustrate his point, Martin Luther King's "Dixie"
story, was one King told to a largely white audience. Brewer, supra note 8, at 1854; Delgado, supra
note 25, at 2413-16.
63. Delgado, supra note 25, at 2430-31, 2434-35.
64. Id. Consider, for example, how four different audiences might react to Brewer's own
story. Brewer recounts a story Martin Luther King once told a radio audience. In the story, King's
children took part in a musical program at their newly desegregated Atlanta school. The program
contained only music drawn from the musical mainstream. No spirituals or other black music was
included, and the program concluded with the playing of "Dixie." Brewer, supra note 8, at 1854.
This is surely an effective and moving story, told by a master storyteller. Yet, would it automati-
cally produce agreement-reduce the original distance among-all readers? One could imagine dif-
ferent readers reacting as follows:
(1) A hard-line Southerner. "Of course the program concluded with 'Dixie'-it's our cultural
symbol. If these newly admitted blacks want to fit into our schools and culture, they had better get
used to that. There is nothing political or offensive about 'Dixie'; it's a rousing good song. Whether
minstrel music ought to have been included in the program, well, we couldn't include everybody's
favorite music or we would have had an interminable program with Irish jigs and Polish polkas
going on all night."
(2) A sympathetic white: "King is absolutely right. Anyone can understand the pain of a
young black schoolchild forced to listen to the symbol of white resistance. And the failure to in-
clude black music in the program was indefensible-sheer cultural supremacy and narrowness. The
school administrators should have been ashamed of themselves."
(3) A scientific legalist: "This may suggest cultural imperialism at work, but it may not. We
must first determine whether black spiritual music meets the merit-based standards required for
inclusion. Maybe the rest of the program consisted of Beethoven and Mozart. What specific black
works were proposed, and how do we know they measured up to the competition?"
(4) A member of CRS: "Brewer's very story illustrates our point-the school administrators
simply didn't see anything wrong with what they did. Under prevailing musical standards in effect
in the South at the time, they probably did the right thing-offered the audience what most of it
wanted. Our point is that this entire mindset was wrong and needed changing; but it won't change
until we begin asking the right questions."
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cure our racial ills. Perhaps recognizing the size of the gulf between the
two groups, Brewer concludes his call with a plea for mutual story-
telling. The exchange of stories and narratives should, of course, be en-
couraged. 5 Yet, I question whether they will have much effect in the
current polarized climate.
Some of us believe a storm is coming, but others believe it is only a
squall. Some of us are committed deeply to the present system, but
others liken the current civil rights approach to a too-short tree and are
anxious to try a taller one. Conflict and vigorous competition thus may
be more in order today than a premature peace that leaves vital ques-
tions unaddressed.6 6 Just as explorers sometimes really want to go to
different destinations, CRS and the scientific-legalists, for now at any
rate, may be destined to march along different, and not appreciably
converging, tracks.
65. I have made the same suggestion a number of times. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1;
Delgado, supra note 25; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 24. Indeed, a few mainstream liberals
have modified their views in our direction.
66. Not all disputes can be made to disappear through verbal means. On the limits of story-
telling, see Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narrativity: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?,
67 Tm L. REv. - (1991, forthcoming). See also Delgado, supra note 52, at 1876-77 (observing
that unarticulated differences about power, knowledge and the "naturalness" of certain arrange-
ments may impede discussion between CRS and the scientific-legal wing of civil rights scholars).
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